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Abstract
This paper evaluates the peer effects on individual academic perfor-
mance. The identification strategy considers the architecture of friend-
ship networks within classrooms, in addition to group and individual
fixed effects. Estimates of spatial autoregressive models show that an in-
crease of one standard deviation (sd) in peers’ math grade improves by
6% sds the student’s grade. Furthermore, when we also consider the indi-
rect friendship bonds, the aggregate peer impact raises to 45% sds of the
individual math grade.
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Resumo
Este artigo avalia o efeito dos pares sobre o desempenho escolar a par-
tir da estrutura da rede de amizades do aluno. A estratégia de identifi-
cação explora a arquitetura dessas redes associadas a controles de efeitos
fixos individuais e de grupo. Modelos de econometria espacial mostram
que um aumento de um desvio-padrão na nota agregada de matemática
dos amigos, gera um aumento padronizado do rendimento individual em
6%. Ademais, quando os amigos indiretos são incluídos na análise, esse
impacto aumenta para 45%. As estimações utilizam base inédita da FUN-
DAJ (2013) que traz o levantamento da rede de amizades do aluno na
turma.
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1 Introduction
One of the prominent issues within the economics of education is devoted
to understanding the role of peers in educational outcomes.1 The behavioral
influence received from friends in the social interaction process might affect
educational outcomes not only during the schooling period but also later in
life, having an effect on standards of educational attainment to employment
decisions. Friends are a source of interaction, motivation and aspiration in
the learning process and their influence operates on slightly distinct mecha-
nisms. For example, in a more subtle way, students can benefit from externali-
ties of knowledge created by discussions and questions from other classmates.
Peer effects can also be disseminated by imitation or contagion, in which case
students have individual motivations for displaying a behavior/performance
that is consistent with the group in which he or she is inserted. In an im-
portant psychological study, Harris (1995) shows that childhood friends are
relatively more important to their development than their parents or home en-
vironment. She states that, in the pursuit to be part of the peer group, children
can radically change their personality when away from parental supervision.
Behaviors that deviate from those expected by the group are generally not ac-
cepted and tend to be excluded.
Manski (1993) argues that if individual academic performance increases as
the average class performance increases, then peer effects act as a social mul-
tiplier and, as a result, have implications for educational policies. Empirical
identification of peer effects, however, is an arduous exercise. As first noted
by Manski (1993), and after by many other authors, the greatest difficulty is
to properly separate endogenous peer effects, from other contextual or corre-
lated effects. In educational contexts, endogenous peer effects represent the
influence of peers’ academic outcomes on individual achievement. The con-
textual effect captures the effects of exogenous peers’ attributes, such as age,
gender, and race, on individual outcome. And the correlated or confounding
effects correspond to non-observable characteristics shared by individuals in
the same group that are correlated with the peer variable of interest. These
common traits occur either for being exposed to the same institutional en-
vironment or for homophily, which is the propensity of people with similar
attributes to associate with each other.
Depending on the way in which the boundaries of the group are defined, it
is impossible to distinguish the endogenous from the exogenous peer effects,
even in the absence of correlated effects. For instance, when the behavioral
influence of the group is treated as homogenous, in which case all the mem-
bers inside it are affected by all the others in their groups and by none outside
it, the simultaneous nature of educational results creates a perfect collinearity
between the expected mean outcome of the group and its mean characteris-
tics – the reflection problem as defined by Manski (1993) – making infeasible
the distinction between the effect of peers’ educational outcome and peers’
characteristics that do impact on their outcomes.
1The terms peers, friends, colleagues, and partners will be used interchangeably in this article.
Peers are all members belonging to a reference group (classroom, school, neighborhood, etc.)
but who are not necessarily friends with each other and may not even know each other. The
reason why these words are used without distinction here is to be consistent with the term widely
used in the literature, peer effects, which, in many studies, is used to refer to all of these subjects
interchangeably.
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Usually, to overcome such constraints, empirical identification strategies
rely either on the use of exogenous instruments for peers’ educational out-
come (e.g. Case & Katz 1991, Evans et al. 1992, Hanushek et al. 2001, Ding &
Lehrer 2007, Goux &Maurin 2007, Vigdor & Nechyba 2007, Sund 2009) or on
experimental or quasi-experimental data that claim that groups are formed
by rules exogenous to individuals, thus avoiding confounding or correlated
effects (Eisenkopf et al. 2011, Duflo et al. 2008, Sacerdote 2001, Zimmerman
2003, Oosterbeek & Van Ewijk 2014).
A new segment in the related literature uses as identification strategy the
architecture of social networks – structures that keep track of all the links
among its members and that build information flow, social norms, and so-
cial behaviors (e.g. Patacchini & Venanzoni 2014, Badev 2014, Patacchini
et al. 2011, Angelo 2010, Calvó-Armengol et al. 2009, Bramoullé et al. 2009,
Ballester et al. 2006). The main idea behind this strategy is that the refer-
ence groups are not homogeneous: they might be different in size, but they
do not necessarily completely overlap. For example, it is possible that within
the same network student i and j are friends, student j and k also, but i and
k are not friends. Therefore, the reference group of each member is different
in size and composition. Bramoullé et al. (2009) argue that it is exactly this
heterogeneous nature of reference groups that permits us to overcome Man-
ski’s reflection problem, and provide us with formal conditions to identify the
endogenous peer effects.
The main objective in this paper is to assess the dissemination of peer
effects on school performance within the framework of students’ friendship
networks. The diffusion of endogenous peer effects is captured by observed
friend’s school achievement in a spatial autoregressive model (SAR). Conditional
Maximum Likelihood (CML) estimations together with network and individ-
ual fixed effects are adopted as econometric strategies for identifying the in-
fluence of peers’ academic outcomes.
We closely follow the paper of Calvó-Armengol et al. (2009); however, we
advance and provide additional contributions in the following aspects. The
empirical estimations are based on a unique educational dataset that comes
from a research institute of the Brazilian Ministry of Education (Fundação
Joaquim Nabuco/FUNDAJ, 2013), which provides a large information set on
students’ school environment. This dataset offers two crucial features for iden-
tifying peer effects: (i) it raises the direct friendship network within the class-
room, and (ii) it provides a longitudinal evaluation of scholastic achievement,
in which all the students surveyed are submitted to a math test in the be-
ginning and at the end of scholar year. The initial math grade turns to be
especially appropriate to control for preexisting differences between students.
Each exam consists of twenty multiple choice questions and was conceived
according to the Item Response Theory (IRT)2. To the best of our knowledge,
besides the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health (Add Health)3,
2Item Response Theory models the response of each examinee of a given ability to each item
in the test. The items are not assumed to be equally difficult, and the difficulty level of each one
is treated as information to be incorporated in scaling items.
3Add Health is a longitudinal survey of American schools with teens that focuses primarily on
the network of friends of these students. The research has a sample of 90,118 students distributed
in a representative manner in 132 public and private schools in the United States. Since 1994, the
survey has collected five panels (1994, 1995, 1996, 2001 and 2008) to the students of the 7th year
by the end of high school. A subsample of these students (approximately 20,000) answers a very
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there is no other survey that provides such data; it is thus unique for develop-
ing countries.
Besides this introduction, the paper is organized into four additional sec-
tions. Section two describes the FUNDAJ ((FUNDAJ - Fundação JoaquimNabuco
and Coordenação de Estudos Econômicos e Populacionais 2013)) dataset and
offers a descriptive analysis based on the sample variables used. The third sec-
tion presents the peers network model and the identification strategies imple-
mented to estimate peer effects on academic performance. The fourth section
provides the estimated results, and finally, the last section brings together the
main findings of the article.
2 The dataset and descriptive statistics of the variables
This article uses a unique dataset from a survey conducted by the Joaquim
Nabuco Foundation in 2013 with a sample of students in the 6th year of pub-
lic schools in the city of Recife, Pernambuco State, Brazil. The research evalu-
ated student performance on two math tests (which were given at the begin-
ning and the end of the school year). Interviewers also collected a large set of
information on internal and external aspects of school life through four types
of questionnaires (one for students, one for the primary adult responsible for
each child’s academic life, one for the math teacher, and another one for the
school principal). The main highlight of the survey was the identification of
the student friendship networks inside the classrooms. This type of data is
crucial for identifying the extent of peer influence on the learning process. In
the student’s questionnaire, they listed up to five best friends and reported
whether they were classmates, whether they studied together, whether they
go to each other’s houses, and whether they talk about problems. The stu-
dent’s caregivers also reported whether they knew those friends and/or their
families and what kind of influence they believed these friends had on their
child. Thus, for every friend from the classroom, the data included not only
the friend’s grade on the two math tests but also all of the additional informa-
tion collected from the questionnaires.
Other characteristics of the research, such as the student’s perceived self-
esteem, future aspirations, and anthropometric measurements, provided a
rich set of control variables that enabled better specifications of the models.
In total, 4,191 students, 3,670 parents or guardians, 120 principals, and
131 teachers from 120 schools were interviewed. The school units were spa-
tially distributed among 18 micro-regions of Recife4. In some schools with
higher enrollment in the 6th year, two groups were randomly selected, not
just one. For this reason, the total number of classrooms selected for the sam-
ple was 146.
After the exclusion of individuals with inadequate or missing information,
the final sample consisted of 139 networks/classrooms and 1,670 students.
detailed questionnaire that contains information about their network of friends referring up to
ten best friends, five females and five males.
4Each political-administrative region of Recife is divided into three micro-regions “in order to
define municipal interventions at the local level and in coordination with the population”. Each
region is composed of one or more of the 94 Districts established by Brazilian Law. The 18 micro-
regions correspond to the division of Political-Administrative Regions, which was conceived in
1995 by the Department of Social Policies to organize Participatory Budgeting meetings that had
been limited to associations and their representatives (PNUD 2005).
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Table 1 shows the definition and descriptive statistics of the variables used in
the estimations of this paper. Performance in math was assessed at the begin-
ning and at the end of school year, and on average, students in the sample had
about 40% success, with no significant variation during the period of study.
3 Peers network model and identification strategies
Themodel developed here is based on Ballester et al. (2006) andCalvó-Armengol
et al. (2009), and the changes adopted are properly mentioned throughout the
paper.
Network: Suppose there is a social network of 1, 2..., n agents, represented
by matrix G, which brings together a collection of bilateral influences gij be-
tween them. There is an active connection within the network when gij = 1
and an inactive connection when gij = 0. As per convention, gii=0.
Preferences: Consider a network game5 in which every player i = 1, 2... n
selects a specific educational effort (yi ) and obtains a payoff ui (y1,y2...yn; g),
which depends on the friends efforts (y−i ), defined as:6









The variable y0i ≥ 0 represents the initial educational background of in-
dividual i and can be interpreted as an innate condition for learning. gij de-
notes the friendship relationship within the network. The utility of each in-




reflects strategic complementarities in relation to the efforts of the others,
∂2ui
∂yi∂yj
= ρgij ≥ 0. As pointed out by Calvó-Armengol et al. (2009), educational
strategic complementarities means that if colleague j increases his/her educa-
tional efforts, yj (e.g., by studying for longer hours), then student i will have
his/her marginal utility increased if he or she also broadens effort, yi . Accord-
ing to Calvó-Armengol et al. (2009), the parameter ρ measures the intensity
of the endogenous imitation peer effects. This parameter captures to what ex-
tent students are “contaminated” by the behaviors of their companions.
Parameter µ, in turn, means that, regardless of bilateral influences, each
5In network games, the interdependence between players’ payoffs comes from the frame of
their connections within a network (Ballester et al. 2006). The action of any member of the
individual i reference group could affect the outcome of i, either because it is directly connected
to this person (g = 1) or because even if not directly connected to him/her, this individual i can
also be affected indirectly, through the influence of a friend who is connected to him/her.
6Model of equation 1 is a special case of the Ballester et al. (2006) model:







in which αi = µ y
0
i , β = 1, γ = 0 and λ = ρ. In the article, the authors decompose the interactions
between players in three types of effects: Σ = −βI−γJ+λG. −βI represents the effect of the effort
itself (concave preference), −γJ, global substitution effect and +λG, the effect of the local comple-
mentarities. The global substitution effect means that if an agent j increases his/her efforts, then
individual iwill suffer a reduction in his utility if he/she decides to increase his/her efforts as well.
These effects, however, are more natural when there are strategic interactions in the provision of
a public non-excludable good, such as the sharing of ideas and information by opinion makers
(providers) along with their connections (free-riders) (Jackson, 2008). In the model proposed
herein, it is considered the only scenario in which students exhibit complementary strategies in




























Table 1: Definition and descriptive statistics of the variables
Definition of variables Average Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable (y)
Math grade at the end of the year
Grade of the student i on math test conducted by FUNDAJ ((FUNDAJ
- Fundação Joaquim Nabuco and Coordenação de Estudos Econômi-
cos e Populacionais 2013)) at the end of school year. Rating scale
ranges from 0 to 100.
40.73 16.00
Individual Characteristic (X)
Initial math grade (y0)
Grade of student i on math test conducted by FUNDAJ (2013) at the
beginning of school year. Rating scale ranges from 0 to 100. 43.43 16.60
Male Dummy equals 1 if student is male 0.44 0.50
Whites
Dummy equals 1 if students declare themselves as white and 0 if they
describe themselves as black, mixed race, Asian, or indigenous 0.19 0.39
Age Age of the student in years 11.18 0.86
Newcomer
Dummy equals 1 if student has been attending the school researched
for less than one year 0.73 0.44
Dedication to Studies
Student answers the question “How often do you study the school
materials:” 1 = every day of the week, 2 = only on school days, 3 =
3 days per week, 4 = less than 3 days per week, 5 = only if there is a
test, 6 = never or almost never
2.55 1.51
Praise from Teacher
Student answers the question “the math teacher praises or congratu-
lates you when you get a good grade or do the homework well”: 1 =
always or almost always, 2 = sometimes, 3 = never or almost never
1.49 0.66
Personality
Student answers the question “I would change something in my per-
sonality”: 1 = strongly agree, 2 = perhaps, 3 = strongly disagree 2.40 0.88
Left out in classroom
Student answers the question “Do you feel left out in class”: 1 = al-
ways or almost always, 2 = sometimes, 3 = never or almost never 2.70 0.57
No. of observations: 1,670 students
No. networks/classrooms: 139 classrooms



















Table 1: Definition and descriptive statistics of the variables (continued)
Definition of variables Average Standard Deviation
Individual Characteristic (X)
Popular
Student answers the question “I am a popular person, I have many
friends”: 1 = strongly agree, 2 = perhaps, 3 = strongly disagree 1.35 0.67
Visits to friends’ houses Number of friends in the class who students regularly visit 1.05 1.25
Number of friends Number of nominated friends of student i 2.88 1.33
Religiousness
Student answers the question “Do you ever go to church/mass?”: 1 =
always or almost always, 2 = sometimes, 3 = never or almost never 1.76 0.70
Sports clubs, gyms
Dummy equals 1 if student attends a sports club, sports center or
fitness facility in their neighborhood 0.23 0.42
Safety in the neighborhood Dummy equals 1 if student says he/she feels safe in their neighbor-
hood
0.79 0.40
Proportion of peers neighbors
Number of friends of student i living in the same neighborhood over
the total number of student i friends 0.30 0.35
Male sex (parent or guardian)
Dummy equals 1 if a parent or person responsible for the student is
male 0.13 0.34
White (parent or guardian)
Dummy equals 1 for parents/guardians who declare themselves
white and 0 if they declare themselves as black, mixed race, Asian,
or indigenous
0.17 0.38
Age (parent or guardian) Age of student’s primary parent or guardian in years 38.48 8.18
Educational level (parent or
guardian)
Parents/guardians answer the question: “What is the highest grade
finished successfully?”: 1 = 1 year (literacy), ..., 9 = 9 years; 10 = 1
year of high school, ..., 12 = last year of high school; 13 = 1 year of
university ..., 18 = final year of university
8.90 3.45
Marital Status (parent or
guardian)
Dummy equals 1 for parents/guardians married with a legally recog-
nized union or common-law marriage 0.55 0.50
No. of observations: 1,670 students
No. networks/classrooms: 139 classrooms




























Table 1: Definition and descriptive statistics of the variables (continued)
Definition of variables Average Standard Deviation
Individual Characteristic (X)
Kinship (parent or guardian) with
student
Dummy equals 1 for natural or adoptive parent and 0 for the other
cases (grandparents, uncles, brothers, stepfather / stepmother, etc.) 0.82 0.38
Beneficiary of social program (par-
ent or guardian)
Dummy equals 1 if parents/guardian receives any government finan-
cial assistance 0.62 0.49
Student grade report (parent or
guardian)
Parents/guardians answered the question “Do you check the stu-
dent’s grade report?”: 1 = always or almost always, 2 = sometimes,
3 = never or almost never
1.19 0.50
Peers’ math grade (Gy) Aggregate value of math grade (end of the year) over student i friends 93.80 71.30
Peers’ characteristic (GX)
Average values of all students’ control variables among the group of
direct friends of student i
Network/classroom features
Classroom is disciplined
Teacher responds to the statement, “This classroom is disciplined”: 1
= agree, 2 = partially agree, 3 = disagree 2.09 0.74
Classroom is aggressive
Teacher responds to the statement “This classroom is aggres-
sive/violent”: 1 = agree, 2 = partially agree, 3 = disagree 2.55 0.63
Cumulative tests
Dummy equals 1 if the teacher says that the subjects of the tests are
cumulative 0.67 0.47
No. of observations: 1,670 students
No. networks/classrooms: 139 classrooms
Source: Original compilation based on FUNDAJ (2013).
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individual has a positive payoff that depends on his/ her initial educational
background y0i . Therefore, µy
0
i measures the return of the educational effort,
given the ex-ante circumstance of the individual.
Equilibrium: The Nash equilibrium y∗i (g) is defined as the action of agent
i that maximizes payoff ui(y;g), which is found by maximizing equation (1)
relative to yi . Thus, for each agent i = 1, 2 ..., n, the following best-response
function is yielded:






An interesting feature of this equilibrium solution is that it can be ex-
pressed as a function of a sociability measure named Katz-Bonacich centrality
by0:
y∗ = µ(I− ρG)−1y0 = µby0 (3)
This measure of centrality determines the importance of individual i in a
network G and considers his/her direct and indirect ties with each individual
of the network, where a lower weight is assigned to more distant connections
(Bonacich 1987). As a result, the estimated Katz-Bonacich centrality provides
the global influence of peers over student achievement, not only through di-
rect friends, but also through indirect ones. Its mathematical expression is
denoted by the following expression (4):
by0 = (I− ρG)−1 · y0 = y0 + ρG · y0 + ρ2G2 · y0 + ρ3G3 · y0 + . . . =
+∞∑
l=0
ρlGl · y0 (4)
in whichGl identifies the indirect links that run the length l of each agent and
when ρ is sufficiently small, this infinite sum converges to a finite value. In
order to provide an empirical counterpart of the theoretical results derived so
far, we extend equation (2) and propose the following structural model which
will be used for estimations:





gij,kyj,k +θi,k (x) +φζζi,k +θk (c) +φηηk + εi,k (5)
where yi,k is the the math grade at the end of the school year of student i in net-
work k and k = 1, ... and K is the set of networks. In each network, there are nk
individuals, and the total number of students is n =
∑K
k=1nk . The components
θi,k (x) and θk(c) represents control functions in which x is a vector of individ-
ual characteristics, while c is another vector of classrooms features. The other
terms ζi,k and ηk are included in order to represent the non-observable effects
of the individual and the network, respectively. In matrix notation, equation
(5) is denoted by:
y = µy0 + ρGy+θ (x) +φζζ +θ (c) +φηη + ε (6)
where θ(x) = Xβ +GXγ and θ(c) = Cα
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G is constructed so as to create a block diagonal matrix in which the ma-
trix interaction of every classroom gk creates a specific block7. As a result,
students who belong to a particular network or classroom gk do not connect
with students who are members of another network g′k. It should be remem-
bered that the reference group for each student i is the quantity of nominated
friends within the network to which the student belongs and that there may
be intersections among these intra-network groups.
The main parameters of interest are (µ,ρ). The variable linked to µ is
the student’s initial educational background (y0), measured here by the math
grade in the beginning of the school year, while the variables linked to ρ are
the math grades at the end of the school year received by the student’s nomi-
nated friends in his/her classroom (Gy).
3.1 Identification strategies
In this study, the identification strategies of peer effects consist of two ex-
ercises. In the first one, we conduct ordinary least squares estimations on
equation (6) in order to capture potential correlations between individual’s
academic performance and direct friends’ achievement. However, even un-
der the control of network fixed effects, the parameters (µ,ρ) might remain
biased because of spatial dependence on the error term introduced by the si-
multaneity nature of the dependent variable y. Therefore, in a second exercise,
we treat equation (6) as a spatial autoregressive model and adopt maximum
likelihood (ML) estimations in order to control for simultaneity bias in the
dependent variable.
Nevertheless, similar to the OLS models, the estimation strategy of spatial
econometric models relies on the assumption that the variable of interest is
not correlated with the regression error. Therefore, the exogeneity require-
ment of matrix G is a necessary condition for obtaining consistent estimates.
It turns out that this is a strong assumption, because friendships are usually
structured by a sense of homophily. Thus, the procedure adopted in litera-
ture (Patacchini & Venanzoni 2014, Calvó-Armengol et al. 2009, Bramoullé
et al. 2009, Lee 2007) includes group fixed effect ηk to capture unobserv-
able heterogeneity, which may be correlated with the variables of interest, in






= 0. Patacchini & Venanzoni (2014) find that the inclu-
sion of network fixed effects is a sufficient strategy to control for individual
fixed effects as well, when working with relatively small social networks, as in
Add Health and also in the sample used herein. Their idea is that, in small net-
works, unobservable heterogeneity is common among all individuals within
a group, and therefore, the network fixed effects would represent a good ap-
proximation for capturing the unobserved individual attributes, as well.
7As an illustration consider two relational matrices for two hypothetical groups each with


















0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0


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In this paper, besides the inclusion of dummies per classroom/network8,
we also rely on the initial math score to control for individual fixed effects.
The initial math grade works here as a strategy to capture unobservable indi-
vidual idiosyncrasies. According to Ding & Lehrer (2007), the students’ initial
grade would be a sufficient statistic for capturing a variety of influences that
may confound the analysis and include all observable and unobservable his-
torical background information on students’ family, school, and community.
The authors assume, hypothetically, that the students’ initial grade follows
a Markov process, and therefore, previous observable and unobservable fac-
tors in t-1 conform to the same rate, so that none of these would cease to be
represented by yi,t−1. The authors’ assumption therefore allows the student’s
initial grade to work as a sort of individual fixed effect, since it brings with
it unobservable components (such as effort and skill), which are invariable
throughout the school year9. Thus, y0i may act as a proxy for the student’s
initial educational background.
Finally, it is worth noting that there may also exist unobservable features
at the school level — for example, the quality of teachers or student body, or
the factors involved in parents’ choices of residence — all of which can affect
both academic performance and network formation. However, the strategy of
controlling for network fixed effects is also capable of absorbing this fixed ef-
fect of school, especially considering that, in the sample used, approximately
80% of the schools surveyed had only one classroom/network under investi-
gation.
4 Results
The empirical estimations for academic peer effects are presented in this sec-
tion. A variety of models are tested using different methods and increasing
order of covariates. The estimations use the indirect friendship network, in
which case the G matrix is symmetric10.
Columns 1 to 3 of Table 2 exhibit the least squares estimates as an initial
exercise to investigate the correlation between individual performance and
the performance of his/her reference group of friends. The positive and sig-
nificant coefficient ρ shows that individual’s academic performance and the
academic performance of the group of friends are directly correlated. The
strength of this correlation decreases as additional covariates are included
and with network fixed effects, as illustrated in column 3. Correlations µ be-
tween the student’s initial background and his/her performance at the end of
the year are significant in all cases and decrease in magnitude based on the
8Another approach commonly used to control for group fixed effects is the deviation to the
reference group mean, in which for each variable in the model it is subtracted its group mean.
9Consider two models with a regression structure for grades at the beginning and end of the
year for student i: y0i ≡ yi1 = α1Xi1︸︷︷︸
Observable
+ β1ui + εi1︸      ︷︷      ︸
Non-observable
e yi2 = α2Xi2︸︷︷︸
Observable
+ β2ui + εi2︸      ︷︷      ︸
Non-observable
where ui
is an unobservable component invariant throughout the scholarly year. According to Boardman
& Murnane (1979), if α2 = θα1 and β2 = θβ1, the effects of variables X and µ change at the same
constant rate θ between t-1 and t. Under such conditions, the inclusion of y0 in the empirical
model (6) allows us to control for this fixed initial condition for each student.
10Some studies show that the results of peer effects do not change according to the symmetry
of matrix G. See, for instance, Patacchini & Venanzoni (2014), Liu et al. (2014), Calvó-Armengol
et al. (2009).
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amount of control variables.
Columns 4 to 6 of Table 2 provide results ofmaximum likelihood estimates
of the spatial models. The ML coefficients coincide with the OLS coefficients
but are slightly smaller in magnitude. Column 4 presents the estimates of the
SARmodel without the main important identification strategies: the student’s
initial math grade and the dummies for network fixed effects. The model of
column 5 adds the student’s initial math and the model of column 6 includes
dummies per classroom in order to control for the network fixed effects. The
coefficients (µ,ρ) vary depending on the inclusion of additional controls. The
influence of peers performance on math over individual achievement mea-
sured here by coefficient ρ is reduced in approximately 14% when the model
is controlled for student’s initial math grade and it is further reduced in 49%
when dummies for network fixed effect are included. A possible conclusion
is that individual and group unobserved characteristics tend to overestimate
the magnitude of peer effects ρ through a positive bias of omitted variable.
Concentrating on our preferred specification model (column 6 of Table
2), we find that a one standard deviation increase in peers’ aggregate math
grade generates a 6.2% increase of a standard deviation in student grade11
12. The standardized coefficients (or beta coefficients) permit to compare the
importance of different control variables over the outcome variable, indepen-
dently of their measurement units. Thus, in relative terms, the peers math
performance stands out as the third most important predictor of the student
math grade at the end of the school year, remaining only less important than
own initial math score (40%) and student’s age (9%). The complete estima-
tions of model (6) from Table 2 are presented in Table A.1 of the appendix,
in which it is possible to verify that the influence of friends’ achievement is
even higher than the effect of the parental schooling, the student perception
about own popularity and the influence of parents who are careful to check for
pupil’s grade report. Many control variables lose significance when dummies
for group fixed effects are included in the model, possibly because they absorb
most of individual and group heterogeneity, as already argued. When those
dummy variables are not included, as in the models of columns (4) or (5), the
results obtained reflect some findings commonly observed in the literature in
which parental schooling increases student performance; older students per-
form lower, and those whose parents check their school records tend to show
higher grades13.
From the estimates of ρ̂, one can calculate the impact of the Katz-Bonacich
measure weighted by the student’s initial math grade. As previously defined,
this measure reflects the effect of direct and indirect friendship connections
11The standardized coefficient, or beta coefficient, is calculated as follows: ρ̂sd = ρ̂[
sd(Gy)
sd(y) ]
12Prior literature finds considerable variance in the values for peer effects, ranging from near
zero (Sanbonmatsu et al. 2006) to 35% standardized impact (Hanushek et al. 2001). In the current
study, the peer effects magnitude is very close to other studies using similar approaches. For
example, Patacchini et al. (2011) find a peer impact of 10% of a standard deviation of student
grade, Calvó-Armengol et al. (2009) find 7%, Lin (2010) find 13% and Sacerdote (2001) find 5%.
Comparisons to previously obtained results are difficult to establish because of different methods
used, and mainly because of differences in study groups. Just to illustrate, here are a few findings
in the literature: Duflo et al. (2008) found a peer effect impact of 14% of a standard deviation of
student grade; Sund (2009), 8%; and Vardardottir (2013), 32%.
13The complete estimations are omitted here, but they are available on request with the au-
thors. In the appendix, the Table A.1 presents the complete estimates from model (6) of Table
2
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Table 2: Estimations for equation 6. Dependent variable: math grade at the
end of the year
OLS SAR
1 2 3 4 5 6
Peer effects (ρ̂) 0.158 0.134 0.071 0.138 0.120 0.062
(Test statistic) (5.775) (5.401) (2.496) (5.488) (5.109) (2.417)





(Test statistic) (19.446) (16.913) (19.758) (17.947)
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Peers’ characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Classroom features Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Network fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
No. of observations 1,670 1,670 1,670 1,670 1,670 1,670
No. of networks 139 139 139 139 139 139
Source: Original compilation based on FUNDAJ (FUNDAJ - Fundação Joaquim Nabuco and
Coordenação de Estudos Econômicos e Populacionais 2013).
on individual performance. The results are presented in Table 3. Calculations
of centrality are given according to equation (4), where point estimates ρ̂ are
obtained from columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) of Table 2. Note it is not possi-
ble to obtain the desired weighted centrality measure for the estimates from
columns (1) and (3), since the model specification do not include the initial
math grade. The average Katz-Bonacich centrality values range from 45.10
to 46.73 depending on the model, and the standard errors are in parenthe-
ses. The results of standardized impact (second row of Table 3) show that
an increase of one standard error of the sociability measure translates into an
increase in performance that will range from 40% to 45% standard errors of
the end grade, which corresponds to additional 6.40 points on the math exam,
something between one and two questions14.
Table 3: Impact of Katz-Bonacich centrality on the math
grade at the end of the year
OLS SAR
1 2 3 4
Average Katz-Bonacich: b̂y0(g, ρ̂) 46.73 45.10 45.36 44.88
(Standard error) (17.75) (16.82) (17.05) (16.78)
Impact of one s.d increase of b̂y0(g, ρ̂) 0.45 0.40 0.44 0.40on the final grade
Source: Original compilation based on FUNDAJ ((FUNDAJ - Fundação
Joaquim Nabuco and Coordenação de Estudos Econômicos e
Populacionais 2013)).
4.1 Robustness tests
In order to check for the robustness of peer effects estimates, we develop ad-
ditional econometric exercises using two alternative peers’ matrices besides
the nominated friendship matrix. The first one consists of a “randomized
14Because the standard deviation of the math grade at the end of the year is 16 (see Table 1), a
40% increase generates, on average, additional 6.40 points: (0.40 x 16 = 6.40).
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friendship matrix” built by drawing at random from the original peer’s ma-
trix, a new friendship network within each classroom, preserving the total
number of students in class, but randomizing the friendship links. The other
is defined as the “same class matrix”, which assigns value one for all students
attending the same class. The robustness tests consist in re-estimate models
from columns (4) to (6) of Table 2, but including these alternative peers’ ma-
trices along with the other control variables. If the coefficient attached to the
nominated friendship network becomes no longer significant, then peer ef-
fects can be interpreted simply as a correlation between similar people in the
same classroom rather than causal effect. The results from these additional ex-
ercises are reported in Table 4, and it turns out that for all specifications mod-
els - columns (1) to (3) - the peer effects coefficient (ρ̂) remains significant and
similar in magnitude from the estimates presented on Table 2. Notice that we
do not find any effect of simulated peer’s network on one’s own outcomes (ρ̂r )
for specifications (1) and (2), only for the model of column (3) we capture an
inverse relationship between student math score and the math performance
of a randomized friendship network, which is probably reflecting an adverse
group effect, common amongst students from public schools in Brazil, who
share poor school environment. The average influence of all the students in
class, depicted from the coefficient (ρ̂all ), demonstrates, as expected, a posi-
tive correlation between own math achievement and the mean performance
from all classroom, for all the tested models.
Table 4: Robustness tests for different matrices Dependent
variable: math grade at the end of the year
SAR
1 2 3
Peer effects (ρ̂) 0.134 0.116 0.107
(Test statistic) (4.522) (4.189) (3.743)
Peer effects using the “randomized −0.006 −0.005 −0.010
friendship matrix” (ρ̂r ) (−1.598) (−1.331) (−2.686)
(Test statistic)
Peer effects using the “same class 0.100 0.073 namatrix” (ρ̂all ) (Test statistic) (3.777) (3.078)
(Test statistic)
Initial math grade (µ̂)
-
0.429 0.398
(Test statistic) (19.602) (17.936)
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Peers’ characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Classroom features Yes Yes Yes
Network fixed effects No No Yes
No. of observations 1,670 1,670 1,670
No. of networks 139 139 139
Source: Original compilation based on FUNDAJ ((FUNDAJ - Fundação
Joaquim Nabuco and Coordenação de Estudos Econômicos e
Populacionais 2013)).
y = µy0 +ρGy+ ρrGry+ρallGally+θ(x) +φζζ +θ(c) +φηη + ε.
5 Final considerations
This paper evaluates the dissemination of peer effects on school performance
from the framework of students’ friendship networks. The identification strat-
egy exploits the architecture of these social networks to separate the endoge-
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nous effects of peers from other exogenous or contextual effects. It uses a
unique dataset (FUNDAJ, (FUNDAJ - Fundação Joaquim Nabuco and Coorde-
nação de Estudos Econômicos e Populacionais 2013)), which raises the stu-
dents’ friendship network within the classroom, thus bringing crucial infor-
mation for the identification of peer effects, once it takes into account the in-
tragroup heterogeneity. From theoretical and methodological points of view,
this study provides two main contributions. First, it uses a recent dataset
very similar to that of the Add Health Survey but unique for developing coun-
tries. Second, the paper provides a new equilibrium solution for the theoret-
ical model of Calvó-Armengol et al. (2009), in which a student’s educational
outcome is proportional to a Katz-Bonacich centrality measure weighted by
his/her initial learning condition. This achievement-weighted centrality per-
mits one to control preexisting differences between students, which is espe-
cially appropriate for separating endogenous from correlated effects.
We adopt maximum likelihood estimations for spatial econometric mod-
els in order to test for the impact of peers’ school performance on individual’s
math grade. We find that a one standard deviation increase in peer’s aggre-
gate math grade generates a 6% increase of a standard deviation in a student’s
grade. The inclusion of contextual variables, such as individual attributes and
average attributes of friends, and especially the use of dummies for control-
ling for group fixed effects, are all important strategies that can reduce the
bias of omitted variables. Robustness tests including alternative peers’ matri-
ces demonstrate that peer effects estimates remain significant and invariant in
magnitude when the specification models includes a randomized friendship
network and another matrix which accounts for all the students in the class.
Furthermore, the study also finds that, besides the influence of direct friends
in the classroom, indirect friends (friends distant by more than two links
away) also play an important role on student performance. When we con-
sider the direct and indirect friendship bonds, as well as the initial condition
for learning, as measured here by the achievement-weighted Katz-Bonacich
centrality, we find an aggregate peer impact of 45% standard errors of the
final math grade.
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Table A.1: Complete estimates: model from column (6), Table 2
Estimate Standardized Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
Peers’ math grade 0.014 0.062 0.006 2.417 0.016
Initial math grade 0.384 0.028 0.021 17.947 0.000
Male 0.894 0.027 1.120 0.798 0.425
Whites −1.108 −0.096 0.831 −1.333 0.183
Age −1.777 −0.017 0.420 −4.229 0.000
Newcomer 0.611 0.002 1.013 0.603 0.546
Dedication to Studies 0.025 0.034 0.221 0.115 0.908
Praise from Teacher −0.814 −0.027 0.504 −1.615 0.106
Personality 0.487 0.023 0.366 1.330 0.183
Left out in classroom 0.655 0.044 0.565 1.161 0.246
Popular 1.056 0.032 0.480 2.201 0.028
Visits to friends’ houses −0.411 −0.006 0.273 −1.507 0.132
Sports clubs, gyms −0.217 0.000 0.770 −0.282 0.778
Religiousness 0.010 0.020 0.458 0.021 0.983
Safety in the neighborhood 0.808 0.033 0.802 1.007 0.314
Number of friends −0.398 −0.037 0.278 −1.433 0.152
Educational level (parent or guardian) 0.173 0.003 0.100 1.722 0.085
Male sex (parent or guardian) 0.147 0.014 0.971 0.151 0.880
White (parent or guardian) 0.604 0.030 0.871 0.693 0.489
Age (parent or guardian) 0.058 0.003 0.043 1.361 0.174
Marital Status (parent or guardian) −0.111 −0.018 0.655 −0.169 0.866
Kinship (parent or guardian) with student 0.745 0.008 0.910 0.819 0.413
Beneficiary of social program (parent or guardian) −0.279 −0.045 0.705 −0.396 0.692
Student grade report (parent or guardian) −1.419 −0.005 0.641 −2.212 0.027
No. of observations: 1,670 students
No. networks/classrooms: 139 classrooms





























Table A.1: Complete estimates: model from column (6), Table 2 (continued)
Estimate Standardized Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
Male - peers average 0.187 0.021 1.267 0.148 0.883
Whites - peers average −1.223 −0.013 1.262 −0.969 0.332
Religiousness - peers average −0.435 −0.011 0.698 −0.623 0.533
Newcomer - peers average −0.440 −0.001 1.428 −0.308 0.758
Sports clubs, gyms - peers average −0.046 −0.016 1.204 −0.039 0.969
Dedication to Studies - peers average 0.226 0.017 0.325 0.696 0.486
Personality - peers average 0.455 0.012 0.564 0.806 0.420
Left out in classroom - peers average −0.488 −0.015 0.894 −0.546 0.585
Popular - peers average −0.526 −0.031 0.753 −0.698 0.485
Safety in the neighborhood - peers average −1.691 −0.013 1.168 −1.447 0.148
Praise from Teacher - peers average −0.458 −0.026 0.787 −0.583 0.560
Educational level (parent or guardian) - peers average 0.158 0.003 0.145 1.086 0.277
Male sex (parent or guardian) - peers average −0.207 −0.025 1.406 −0.148 0.883
White (parent or guardian) - peers average 1.441 0.034 1.259 1.145 0.252
Age (parent or guardian) - peers average 0.092 0.007 0.062 1.480 0.139
Marital Status (parent or guardian) - peers average −0.308 −0.001 0.971 −0.318 0.751
Kinship (parent or guardian) with student - peers average −0.079 −0.028 1.317 −0.060 0.952
Beneficiary of social program (parent or guardian) - peers average −1.229 −0.014 1.047 −1.174 0.240
Student grade report (parent or guardian) - peers average −0.622 −0.012 0.945 −0.658 0.510
Initial math grade - peers average 0.015 0.024 0.032 0.490 0.624
Proportion of peers neighbors −1.107 −0.062 1.076 −1.030 0.303
(Intercept) 33.394 0.399 8.990 3.715 0.000
No. of observations: 1,670 students
No. networks/classrooms: 139 classrooms
Source: Original compilation based on FUNDAJ ((FUNDAJ - Fundação Joaquim Nabuco and Coordenação de Estudos Econômicos e Populacionais 2013)).
